

Hong Kong Centre for Human Rights (HKCHR)
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Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China

About Us

Hong Kong Centre for Human Rights is established in 2022 by a group of human rights defenders from Hong Kong with background in policy and legal research. We aim to provide credible information on Hong Kong's legal, political, and human rights development with the goal of supporting the resilient civil society of Hong Kong and upholding international human rights standards.

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Follow up to the previous review

1. This submission by the Hong Kong Centre for Human Rights (“HKCHR”) focuses on the implementation of recommendations to China in the 3rd cycle with reference to the human rights situation in Hong Kong SAR since the last review in 2018.
2. The impacts of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (“NSL”) on human rights and civil society are highlighted in this submission.
3. It is submitted that China has failed to implement the recommendations in the 3rd cycle with regard to Hong Kong reviewed herein, and the human rights violations by the Chinese and Hong Kong governments in Hong Kong are severe and worsening. There are also attempts by the Chinese and Hong Kong governments to whitewash their human rights violations against the people of Hong Kong. The severe ongoing crackdown on the civil society of Hong Kong has reduced its ability to monitor the situation and uphold human rights standards.

#1 National Security

4. China has not implemented recommendations in the 3rd cycle to uphold One Country, Two Systems for Hong Kong (**recommendation 28.343 by Australia**) or to clearly define national security law (**recommendation 28.152 by Belgium**).
5. As observed by the HRCttee, there was an overly broad interpretation of and arbitrary application of the NSL, leading to undue restriction of a wide range of human rights.¹
6. Since the NSL came into force on 30 June 2020, around 100 civil society organizations (“CSOs”) have disbanded or left the city;² as of April 2023, 250 people, including pro-democracy politicians, peaceful activists and journalists, were arrested under the NSL and/or for sedition, 151 of them were prosecuted.³ Since the NSL removed the presumption in favour of bail for national security cases, as of 31 March 2023, 100 out of 140 individuals charged with national security offences are denied bail and currently under pre-trial detention,⁴ with some of them detained for longer than two years.⁵
7. A broad and arbitrary interpretation of the NSL does not only affect court cases but permeates all aspects of governance in Hong Kong. Most recently, the government warned that using environmental issues to press the government could be deemed as endangering national security, which is evidence that Hong Kong of China has not implemented Cameroon’s recommendation in the 3rd cycle that citizens’ right to know, participate and supervise in the environmental field should be protected (**Recommendation 28.137**).
8. Reinforced by a so-called interpretation of the NSL by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (“NPCSC”) in 2022, the Committee for Safeguarding National Security has the power to make rules and decisions where national security is involved; and it has the power to decide whether national security is involved. Its decisions and work process are not subject to judicial review nor interference by the legislature and must be complied with by all branches of the Hong Kong government.
9. Hong Kong courts accede a high degree of deference to the government’s interpretation of the laws related to national security, and have failed to accord sufficient weight to human rights provisions in

the NSL and Hong Kong's human rights obligations.⁶ This is in addition to the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers' finding that the NSL affects the independence of the judiciary, the ability of lawyers to exercise their profession independently, and the due process guarantees of the right to a fair trial (Ref.: OL CHN 2/2023).

#2 Police excessive use of force and absence of effective monitoring

10. The police excessively and indiscriminately used chemical substances and less lethal weapons against unarmed and peaceful protesters during the protest movement in Hong Kong in 2019 and 2020.⁷ Despite the abundant evidence including video footages and eye witnesses, as well as court judgments confirming the truth of certain incidents of excessive force,⁸ the police to a large extent enjoyed impunity.⁹ The government refuses to establish an independent commission of inquiry to thoroughly investigate the police use of force in the movement.
11. The Court of First Instance held that the police complaint handling mechanism fails to meet the requirement of independent investigation under article 7 of ICCPR. The government has not conducted any reforms since the court decision was made in 2020.¹⁰
12. The current complaint mechanism does not provide legal protection against self-criminalisation when the complainant or witness give evidence to the Police, which makes people reluctant to initiate a complaint or assist in an investigation.

#3 Rule of Law and Judicial independence

13. China and Hong Kong have not implemented the recommendation by Australia in the 3rd cycle to “uphold the rights, freedoms and rule of law embodied in the one country, two systems framework for Hong Kong” (**Recommendation 28.343**).
14. To supplement para 10 above, judicial independence in Hong Kong deteriorates under the NSL as it gives significant powers to the administration to interfere in judicial matters. Moreover, Chinese authority has the power to interpret the NSL. In December 2022, it interpreted the NSL contrary to the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal's decision, effectively overruling the court's supposed final decision.¹¹ The letter by the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers to China dated 19 April 2023 (Ref: OL CHN 2/2023) has succinctly analysed these issues.
15. Other than the NSL, the Hong Kong Government amended the legal aid system in 2021 which had the effect of restricting access to legal representation.¹² Please also refer to the Special Rapporteur's letter.

#4 Freedom of peaceful assembly

16. China and Hong Kong have not implemented the recommendation by France in the 3rd cycle, specifically on Hong Kong's freedoms of expression, assembly and association (**Recommendation 28.205**).
17. Hong Kong government has used the Public Order Ordinance, public health regulations, and most recently the NSL and sedition law to restrict citizens' right to hold peaceful assembly for political expression.

18. The government has used stop-and-search, arrest, preventive detention, and other informal practice to threaten organisers and participants not to hold or take part in peaceful assembly after the enactment of NSL.¹³
19. From 2022 to 2023, incidents are recorded where pro-democracy activists would be warned and harassed ahead of traditionally dates of protests in Hong Kong.¹⁴ The police has also made unreasonable requests for protest organisers to ensure public order and safety as a prerequisite of holding a public assembly.¹⁵ In one instance, an organiser cancelled a rally after being taken by the Police; he was barred from disclosing the reason of the decision due to article 63 of the NSL.¹⁶
20. On the anniversary of the Tiananmen Massacre in 2023, 6,000 police officers were deployed to prevent any assembly or commemoration activity in public place.¹⁷ People were stopped and searched merely because of innocuous acts such as wearing black,¹⁸ holding flowers¹⁹ or electronic candles.²⁰ Police arrested 5 peaceful citizens for sedition and took 23 people to police stations as a *de facto* form of preventive detention for peaceful assembly.²¹

#5 Freedom of Association

21. China and Hong Kong have not implemented the recommendations in the 3rd cycle to guarantee freedom of association (**28.205 by France, 28.337 by Belgium, 28.338 by Costa Rica, 28.210 by Russia**).
22. The government has used the NSL and other existing laws, such as the Societies Ordinance, the Trade Unions Ordinance, and anti-money laundering laws to persecute associations.²² HRCtee had previously criticised the two ordinances for incompliance with the ICCPR.²³ More than 100 CSOs have disbanded or left Hong Kong since the imposition of the NSL due to the immense political pressure and risks.²⁴
23. CSOs are deterred from accessing resources from overseas or collaborating with international partners for fear of being accused of collusion with foreign elements or deemed as a foreign agent.
24. Fundraising activities for some CSOs are obstructed as their bank accounts or crowdfunding platform accounts are closed.²⁵
25. Hong Kong government denounced CSOs in an UN session, alleging their reports to the UN were false and flawed,²⁶ and consistently refused to guarantee non-reprisal against CSOs for engaging with the UN human rights mechanisms.²⁷

#6 Freedom of expression

26. China and Hong Kong have not implemented recommendations in the 3rd cycle on safeguarding the freedom of expression (e.g. **Recommendation 28.205 by France** specifically on Hong Kong), removing restrictions that are not in accordance with international law (e.g. **Recommendation 28.201 by Sweden**), or ensuring a safe environment for journalists (e.g. **Recommendation 28.206 by Greece, 28.207 by Italy, and 28.208 by Luxembourg**).
27. Hong Kong government invoked the archaic offence of sedition under the Crimes Ordinance. As of 31 March 2023, 104 people were arrested for speech-related crimes under the offence of sedition and the NSL.²⁸ The sedition offence has been used to stifle free speech and publications by media-outlets

and journalists,²⁹ authors and publishers of children’s books,³⁰ and individuals possessing material deemed as “seditious”.³¹

28. Film Censorship Ordinance was amended in October 2021 enabling the government to ban films deemed to violate national security interests.³² At least 19 films had been censored, banned or blocked from screening between 2021 and 2023.
29. A local newspaper discontinued a 40-years old satirical comic following criticism from government officials and state-owned media.³³ At least 195 Chinese printed books have been purged from the public libraries over the past two years.³⁴ Publishers who are still publishing politically sensitive works have been banned from the annual book fair.³⁵ Even romantic essays and travel writings authored by democratic figures have also vanished from public libraries.³⁶

#7 Freedom of the press

30. The government has prosecuted over 20 journalists and editors. Apple Daily³⁷ and Stand News³⁸ closed down as a result of the charges against their managements.
31. During the protest movement in 2019 and 2020, journalists suffered verbal and physical assault from the police when covering news. Most of the complaints filed by the Hong Kong Journalists Association were not pursued by the Complaint Against Police Office.³⁹ A journalist was permanently blinded in one eye due to a police-fired rubber bullet.⁴⁰

Administrative measures to restrict press freedom

32. The government implemented administrative changes to prevent journalists from accessing public records: limiting the public's access to directorial information on the Companies Registry,⁴¹ and restricting access to electoral roll data with the Improving Electoral System Bill.⁴²
33. The immigration authorities refused to issue visas to overseas journalists from working in the city.⁴³ The Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Hong Kong highlighted a highly unusual number of visa delays for journalists in Hong Kong.⁴⁴
34. Police announced in September 2020 that the designation of “media representative” would be limited to government-registered and “well-known” international agencies, an attempt to replace a system that was based on membership in journalist associations.⁴⁵

Introduced political censorship in Hong Kong’s public service broadcaster

35. The government effectively took over the Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK), the public service broadcaster, and introduced political censorship on programmes,⁴⁶ as well as removed at least 3,000 episodes of public affairs programmes from its archives which covered important events in Hong Kong between 2008 and 2021, allegedly as an attempt to manipulate history.⁴⁷

#8 Right to political participation

36. China and Hong Kong have not implemented Canada and India’s recommendations on ensuring the right to political participation in the 3rd cycle (**recommendations 28.345 and 28.294**).

37. The HRCttee had also called for Hong Kong to implement universal suffrage and ensure the right to vote and run for elections without unreasonable constraints in the city.⁴⁸
38. Instead, the Chinese and Hong Kong governments further diluted democratic elements in the electoral process by reforming the election system in 2021. This reform provided the Election Committee, a 1500-member body not popularly elected, with the authority to both nominate and assign 40 of its members to concurrently serve in the expanded 90-seat legislature.
39. The number of directly elected representatives in the legislature also significantly dropped from 35 to 20.
40. All candidates must undergo vetting by the national security police and a newly established eligibility review committee, effectively preventing any pro-democracy figures from participating in the election without Beijing's approval.⁴⁹

#9 Immigration Detention in Hong Kong

41. Hong Kong has not implemented recommendations in the 3rd cycle on ceasing arbitrary detention (e.g. **28.177 by the United States of America, 28.171 by Sweden**).
42. Immigration detention in Hong Kong is imposed by the government without any judicial scrutiny, and is widely used as an immigration control measure. The Immigration Ordinance, amended in 2021, empowers the government to detain migrants for indeterminate periods of time.⁵⁰
43. In December 2022, the government announced the routinization of body cavity searches in detention facilities and increased the maximum period of time a detainee could be held in solitary/separate confinement at a stretch from the current maximum of 7 days to 28 days.⁵¹

Recommendations:

National Security

44. Repeal the NSL and the sedition offence immediately and refrain from using them to suppress the expression of critical and dissenting opinions (CCPR/C/CHN-HKG/CO/4, §14, 16)
45. Discontinue all cases against people charged for exercising their free speech and provide them with adequate compensation (CCPR/C/CHN-HKG/CO/4, §42).
46. Release all persons who were arbitrarily detained for pending for trials of NSL or national security related offence, including Jimmy Lai and Chow Hang Tung.

Police excessive use of force and absence of effective monitoring

47. Establish an independent mechanism with adequate powers and mandate to conduct investigation into complaints against police's misconduct and to formulate binding decisions in respect of investigations results (CCPR/C/CHN-HKG/CO/4, §20(a), 22) and provide legal protection to the complainant and witness against self-incrimination for giving statement and evidence.

Rule of Law and Judicial independence

48. Establish an independent legal aid authority which is free from political influence and allow defendants receiving legal aid to participate in the selection of their lawyers (CCPR/C/CHN-HKG/CO/4, §34).
49. Protect lawyers, particularly those who represent political dissidents, from harassment, intimidation and attacks. It should also ensure that all such allegations are promptly, independently and thoroughly investigated, and that victims have access to effective remedies (CCPR/C/CHN-HKG/CO/4, §38).
50. Ensure all interpretations of the Basic Law by the NPCSC are exercised with restraint, complying with the ICCPR, consistent with the rule of law and do not impinge upon Hong Kong's autonomy.

Freedom of peaceful assembly

51. Discontinue charges against and release all persons who were arbitrarily arrested and detained in connection with all peaceful assemblies (CCPR/C/CHN-HKG/CO/4, §48(c)).
52. Government should discharge its positive duty to facilitate peaceful assemblies and to make it possible for participants to achieve their objectives, including providing an enabling environment for the exercise of the right of peaceful assembly without discrimination, and putting in place a legal and institutional framework within which the right can be exercised effectively (CCPR/C/GC/37, §24).

Freedom of Association

53. Cease all constraints imposed on trade unions and discontinue cases against unionists charged regarding their union activities. (CCPR/C/CHN-HKG/CO/4, §50(a))
54. Overhaul the Societies Ordinance and relevant legislations to eliminate impediments to society registration and operation. (CCPR/C/CHN-HKG/CO/4, §50(c))
55. Protect CSOs from charges under the NSL or victimisation stemming from their UN affiliation, ensuring Hong Kong's freedom of association is crucial in upholding human rights and democracy. (CCPR/C/CHN-HKG/CO/4, §50(d))

Freedom of expression

56. Dismiss all charges against individuals prosecuted for exercising their right to freedom of expression and provide adequate compensations. (CCPR/C/CHN-HKG/CO/4, §42(b))
57. Immediately stop censoring books, films, and other material for allegedly breaching the NSL or for being contrary to the interests of national security. Publish a list of the books and materials that have been removed from public libraries (CCPR/C/CHN-HKG/CO/4, §44)

Freedom of the press

58. Safeguard journalists from intimidation and assault and ensure thorough investigation of all such occurrences (CCPR/C/CHN-HKG/CO/4, §42(d)).

59. Cease all legal proceedings initiated against journalists (CCPR/C/CHN-HKG/CO/4, §42(b)).

Right to political participation

60. Implement definitive measures, set against a precise timeline, to establish universal suffrage (CCPR/C/CHN-HKG/CO/4, §52).
61. In the meantime, efforts should be made to reform the electoral system, which include: bolstering the quantity of directly elected seats by public electorate in the Election Committee as well as the Legislative Council, augmenting the number of public voters within the Election Committee, introducing public voting for the Chief Executive's election, revising candidate eligibility criteria and abolish the Candidate Eligibility Review Committee to ensure diversity among candidates, and reassessing and revoking any prejudiced criteria involved in the disqualification process (CCPR/C/CHN-HKG/CO/4, §42(e) and 52).

Immigration Detention in Hong Kong

62. Review its overall immigration policy and legislation with a view to bringing them into line with international human rights and humanitarian standards, strengthening the protection of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees (CCPR/C/CHN-HKG/CO/4, §26(a)).
63. Avoid the administrative detention, strengthen the procedural safeguards against arbitrary detention, including judicial oversight and individual assessment of asylum seekers, particularly those in vulnerable situations (CCPR/C/CHN-HKG/CO/4, §28).

Annex-Reference

¹ [CCPR/C/CHN-HKG/CO/4](#), para 12

² Amnesty International Submission to the HRCtee 135th Session (2022) on Hong Kong, p.11 <https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/ASA1756632022ENGLISH.pdf> <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/06/hong-kong-new-leader-john-lee-must-change-course-to-halt-collapse-of-citys-freedoms/>; for a more detailed documentation of groups disbanded, see “Timeline: 58 Hong Kong civil society groups disband following the onset of the security law”, *Hong Kong Free Press*, 30 June 2022, <https://hongkongfp.com/2022/06/30/explainer-over-50-groups-gone-in-11-months-how-hong-kongs-pro-democracy-forces-crumbled/>

³ “鄧炳強稱香港國安法條例清晰 楊美琪強調公正處理案件”, *RTHK News*, 13 April 2023, <https://news.rthk.hk/rthk/ch/component/k2/1696035-20230413.htm>

⁴ Georgetown Center for Asian Law, *Tracking the Impact of Hong Kong’s National Security Law*, 30 May 2023, <https://www.chinafile.com/tracking-impact-of-hong-kongs-national-security-law>

⁵ “香港國安法最大案件：民主派 47 人初選案開審 多數被告已「未審先囚」兩年”, *BBC*, 6 Feb 2023, <https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/64508812>

⁶ See for example *HKSAR v Lai Man Ling* [2022] HKDC 981, [88]-[110]

⁷ UN Human Rights Committee, *Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of Hong Kong*, 11 Nov 2022, §19; Amnesty International, *Verified: Hong Kong police violence against peaceful protesters*, 21 Jun 2019, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/06/hong-kong-police-violence-verified/>; *New York Times*, *Did Hong Kong Police Abuse Protesters? What Videos Show*, 30 Jun 2019, <https://web.archive.org/web/20230608160353/https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/30/world/asia/did-hong-kong-police-abuse-protesters-what-videos-show.html>; Physicians for Human Rights, *The Reckless use of Tear Gas by Hong Kong Police in Confined Spaces is Dangerous and Patently Unlawful*, 21 Aug 2019, <https://phr.org/our-work/resources/the-reckless-use-of-tear-gas-by-hong-kong-police-in-confined-spaces-is-dangerous-and-patently-unlawful/>; *South China Morning Post*, *The truth about tear gas: how Hong Kong police violated all guidelines for the ‘nonlethalweapon’*, 16 Aug 2019, <https://web.archive.org/web/20210429094512/https://www.scmp.com/magazines/post-magazine/long-reads/article/3022942/truth-about-tear-gas-how-hong-kong-police>

⁸ It was uncovered in a court judgement held on 31 October 2020 that a protestor, the defendant of the case, was surrounded by 5 to 6 police officers at the time of being arrested and was injured and had bleeding from his head because of baton strike. The Judge criticised the police officers for using excessive force against the defendant, stating that the police officers can control the defendant with bare hands, given that he did not carry any weapon and was surrounded by five to six officers. See *香港特別行政區 訴 余德穎* (31/10/2020, DCCC12/2020) [2020] HKDC 992, §§117-120, https://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/ju/ju_frame.jsp?DIS=131565&currpage=&loc=p117

⁹ “反修例涉警投訴多兩宗證屬實 訓喻處理”, *Ming Pao*, 30 Dec 2022, <https://news.mingpao.com/pns/%E6%B8%AF%E8%81%9E/article/20221230/s00002/1672337508908>

¹⁰ *Chan Ki Kau v Hong Kong Police Force* [2020] 5 HKLRD 653, §§46, 101-103, 124

¹¹ “CE welcomes NSL interpretation”, *news.gov.hk*, 30 Dec 2022, https://www.news.gov.hk/eng/2022/12/20221230/20221230_201149_534.html

¹² “法援改制 掀官派律師疑慮”, *Ubeat Magazine*, 28 Dec 2021, https://ubeat.com.cuhk.edu.hk/157_legal-aid/

¹³ Although a small number of assemblies were allowed to take place after the COVID restrictions were lifted, they are mostly non-political and less sensitive, such as religious rallies, and protests against certain government policies related to landfill site location and social welfare.

¹⁴ E.g. “League of Social Democrats says they will not be protesting on July 1”, *The Standard*, 28 June 2022, <https://www.thestandard.com.hk/breaking-news/section/4/191689/League-of-Social-Democrats-says-they-will-not-be-protesting-on-July-1>

¹⁵ “Hong Kong women’s group cancels rally night before demo; police say ‘violent groups’ sought to attend”, *Hong Kong Free Press*, 4 Mar 2023, <https://hongkongfp.com/2023/03/04/hong-kong-womens-group-cancels-rally-night-before-demo-police-say-violent-groups-sought-to-attend/>

¹⁶ “‘Emotional meltdown’: Hong Kong Labour Day demo cancelled, as activist says security law prevents disclosing why”, *Hong Kong Free Press*, 26 Apr 2023, <https://hongkongfp.com/2023/04/26/emotional-meltdown-hong-kong-labour-day-demo-cancelled-as-activist-says-security-law-prevents-disclosing-why/>

¹⁷ “Hong Kong police to field up to 6,000 officers on patrol on June 4: sources”, *The Standard*, 3 Jun 2023, <https://www.thestandard.com.hk/breaking-news/section/4/204440/Hong-Kong-police-to-field-up-to-6,000-officers-on-patrol-on-June-4:-sources>

¹⁸ “六四 34 周年 | 入夜後有市民到維園一帶以不同形式悼念 警方帶走 24 人包括前支聯會常委徐漢光 (22:05)”, *Ming Pao*, 4 Jun 2023,

<https://news.mingpao.com/ins/%E6%B8%AF%E8%81%9E/article/20230604/s00001/1685872340430>

¹⁹ “【六四 34】曾健成帶金花到維園外 警截查後放行”, *inmediahk.net*, 4 Jun 2023,

<https://www.inmediahk.net/node/%E7%A4%BE%E9%81%8B/%E3%80%90%E5%85%AD%E5%9B%9B34%E3%80%91%E6%9B%BE%E5%81%A5%E6%88%90%E5%B8%B6%E9%87%91%E8%8A%B1%E5%88%B0%E7%B6%AD%E5%9C%92%E5%A4%96-%E8%AD%A6%E6%88%AA%E6%9F%A5%E5%BE%8C%E6%94%BE%E8%A1%8C>

²⁰ *ibid*

²¹ “1 arrested, 23 taken away for investigation by Hong Kong police over Tiananmen crackdown commemorations” *Hong Kong Free Press*, 13 June 2023, <https://hongkongfp.com/2023/06/05/1-arrested-23-taken-away-for-investigation-by-hong-kong-police-over-tiananmen-crackdown-commemorations/>

²² “Hong Kong court orders seizure of HK\$70 million from crowd-funding platform that raised money for 2019 protesters”, *Hong Kong Free Press*, <https://hongkongfp.com/2022/09/26/hong-kong-court-orders-seizure-of-hk70-million-from-crowd-funding-platform-that-raised-money-for-2019-protesters/>; see also “Hong Kong takes aim at activists with crowdfunding crackdown”, *Nikkei Asia*, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Hong-Kong-takes-aim-at-activists-with-crowdfunding-crackdown>; “Proposed Hong Kong crowdfunding law will hinder survival of civil groups, says pro-democracy group”, *Hong Kong Free Press*, <https://hongkongfp.com/2023/02/21/proposed-hong-kong-crowdfunding-law-will-hinder-survival-of-civil-groups-says-pro-democracy-group/>; also see “【追擊工會】醫管局員工陣線被職工會要求交資料 分析：以過時方式打壓公民社會”, *RFA*, 17 Sep 2021, <https://www.rfa.org/cantonese/news/hkm/hk-haea-09172021083326.html>

²³ United Nations Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations, CCPR/C/79/Add.117(1999), §20.

²⁴ Amnesty International Submission to the HRCtee 135th Session (2022) on Hong Kong, p.11

<https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/ASA1756632022ENGLISH.pdf>

<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/06/hong-kong-new-leader-john-lee-must-change-course-to-halt-collapse-of-citys-freedom/>; for a more detailed documentation of groups disbanded, see “Timeline: 58 Hong Kong civil society groups disband following the onset of the security law”, *Hong Kong Free Press*, 30 June 2022, <https://hongkongfp.com/2022/06/30/explainer-over-50-groups-gone-in-11-months-how-hong-kongs-pro-democracy-forces-crumbled/>

²⁵ “HSBC among Hong Kong banks that close accounts tied to opposition group, members say” *South China Morning Post*, 3 June 2023, <https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3222818/hdbc-among-hong-kong-banks-close-accounts-tied-opposition-group-members-say>

²⁶ “Opening statement by PSHYA at UN Committee on Elimination of Discrimination against Women meeting (with photo)”, *Information Services Department*,

<https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202305/12/P2023051200451.htm?fontSize=1>

²⁷ “UN Human Rights Committee issues findings on Hong Kong, Macao, Georgia, Ireland, Luxembourg and Uruguay”, *The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights*, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/07/un-human-rights-committee-issues-findings-hong-kong-macao-georgia-ireland>

²⁸ Georgetown Center for Asian Law, *Tracking the Impact of Hong Kong’s National Security Law*, 30 May 2023, <https://www.chinafile.com/tracking-impact-of-hong-kongs-national-security-law>

²⁹ “Hong Kong Journalists Go on Trial for ‘Sedition’”, *VOA News*, 31 Oct 2022,

<https://www.voanews.com/a/hong-kong-journalists-go-on-trial-for-sedition-/6812471.html>; “Prominent Hong Kong journalist Allan Au reportedly held on sedition charge”, *The Guardian*, 11 Apr 2022, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/11/prominent-hong-kong-journalist-allan-au-reportedly-held-on-sedition-charge>

³⁰ “Five Hong Kong speech therapists convicted of sedition over children’s books about wolves and sheep”, *CNN*, 8 Sep 2022, <https://edition.cnn.com/2022/09/08/china/hong-kong-speech-therapists-childrens-books-sedition-conviction-intl-hnk/index.html>

³¹ “Hong Kong: two arrested for possessing ‘seditious’ children’s book”, *The Guardian*, 11 Apr 2022, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/17/hong-kong-two-arrested-for-possessing-seditious-childrens-book>

³² “Hong Kong passes new film censorship law”, *BBC*, 27 Oct 2021, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-59047633>

³³ “Hong Kong political cartoonist axed after 40 years following criticism from officials”, *The Guardian*, 12 May 2023, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/may/12/hong-kong-political-cartoonist-axed-after-40-years-following-criticism-from-officials>

³⁴ “審計促護國安後 圖書館多項作品下架 統計：涉政治資料兩年少四成 湯家驊：宜解釋準則不應隨便審查”, *Ming Pao*, 15 May 2023,

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